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ABSTRACT
Eigenvalue Analysis for Metamorphic Detection
by Sayali Deshpande
Metamorphic viruses change their structure on each infection while maintaining
their function. Although many detection techniques have been proposed, practical
and effective metamorphic detection remains a difficult challenge.
In this project, we analyze a novel method for detecting metamorphic viruses.
Our approach was inspired by a well-known facial recognition technique that is based
on eigenvalue analysis. We compute eigenvectors using opcode sequences extracted
from a set of known metamorphic viruses. These eigenvectors can then be used to
score a given executable file, based on its extracted opcode sequence. We perform
extensive testing to determine the effectiveness of this scoring technique for classifying
metamorphic malware. Our results show that this approach yields very good results
when applied to highly metamorphic malware.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
With the advent of the internet and a plethora of devices ever-connected online,
security is now an issue of paramount importance. Computer malware is a piece
of software that can steal confidential information, compromise infected computer
systems to perform any actions on behalf of a hacker, and can render computer
systems unusable. Malware includes all families of viruses including computer worms,
Trojans, rootkits, spywares, etc. Viruses can replicate and distribute themselves
across a network. They can also have a catastrophic impact on corporate as well as
individual computer systems [19].
A metamorphic virus can mutate itself at each infection such that each copy is
different from the other but essentially performs the same malicious actions. Such
viruses employ various techniques to change and obfuscate virus body such as in-
struction reordering, garbage code insertion, register swapping, and so on. These
mutations make it harder to detect metamorphic viruses.
Although many techniques have been proposed to detect metamorphic viruses,
very few (if any) could operate as a commercial antivirus products. Recently, a
novel approach was proposed for detection of metamorphic viruses that is based on
a face-recognition technique called Eigenfaces [14]. Our technique for metamorphic
virus detection is inspired by this approach. However, our technique differs from
Eigenfaces in the way that it uses opcode sequences of virus files instead of raw
binary virus files for detection. Using opcodes sequences enables the technique to
focus on important code sections of the virus les by avoiding unnecessary processing
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of operands. Our technique performs pre-processing on raw binary files and extracts
opcodes in intermediate files. It implements the Eigenviruses algorithm and processes
the opcode files for both the virus training set and the test set. The technique is
extensively tested using four different highly metamorphic viruses. The results are
analyzed and presented via AUC tables and ROC graphs. Results of the technique are
then compared to the results of other metamorphic virus detection techniques such
as HMM [18] technique and the Eigenviruses [11] technique which uses raw binary
files.
This report is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of metamor-
phic viruses. Section 3 describes various metamorphic virus detection techniques.
Section 4 briefly explains the face-recognition technique called Eigenfaces. Section 5
provides details of Eigenviruses metamorphic detection technique followed by our im-
plementation in Section 6. Various test cases and results are discussed in Section 7.
The report ends with the conclusion and suggests future enhancements.
2
CHAPTER 2
Simple to Metamorphic Virus
A computer virus is a program that infects host files and spreads the infection
from one file to another much like a biological virus [8]. Simple virus replication
can be illustrated as shown in Figure 1. These viruses can be detected using simple
signature-based methods.
Figure 1: Simple Virus Replication
Second generation encrypted viruses carried their own decryptor attached to the
virus body. The decryptor can create a slightly different copy of the virus at each
infection. Encrypted viruses are able to evade signature-based detection. This can
be illustrated in the following Figure 2.
Figure 2: Encrypted Virus Replication
Intuitively, virus writers designed a decryptor that also mutated along with the
virus body. Since the decryptor takes on a new form at each infection with the virus
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body encrypted, these viruses could not be detected by signature detection. These
are called Polymorphic viruses.
Figure 3: Polymorphic Virus Replication
More advanced metamorphic viruses can mutate their virus body at each new
infection while maintaining their behavior. This does not require encryption because
each new copy of the virus infects anew each time, and hence, signature-based detec-
tion cannot be used. This property makes metamorphic viruses one of the hardest to
detect among all the virus families.
Figure 4: Metamorphic Virus Replication
2.1 Metamorphic Techniques
There are many techniques used to generate metamorphic viruses. It is important
to know these techniques in order to detect the viruses effectively. The following
section describes some of these techniques.
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2.1.1 Instruction Reordering
In this technique, virus code is divided among blocks of certain size. The muta-
tion engine reorders these blocks of code producing different copy of the same virus.
These different blocks are connected by inserting jump instructions to ensure the
functionality of the program remains constant.
2.1.2 Garbage Code Insertion
Garbage Code Insertion is also called trash insertion or dead code insertion [11].
In this technique, a mutation engine inserts unnecessary code into the main body of
the virus at random locations. The dead code does not serve any purpose in the main
functionality of the virus. However, its important role is to obfuscate the body of the
virus.
2.1.3 Instruction Substitution
With Instruction Substitution, certain instructions in the virus code are replaced
by equivalent instructions that keep the functionality the same. This technique is used
in metaphor mutation engines [11].
2.1.4 Register Swapping
As the name suggests, Register Swapping uses different registers to store operands
of the virus instruction. Though it changes the appearance of the code it does not
give high variability. This type of virus can be detected using a variant of signature
based detection technique.
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2.1.5 Host Code Mutation
Some viruses like Win95/Bistro mutate their own code as well as the code of
the host file to which they attach [8]. A randomly executing code morphing routine
is used to generate different copies of a virus. The code morphing routine can use
several morphing techniques discussed above.
2.1.6 Code Integration
More advanced viruses such as Zmist, can decompose the host file into smaller
elements and can insert itself into the code. Code Integration then rebuilds the code
and also generates its references [8]. This way the virus integrates itself seamlessly
into the host file, making it hard to detect or even repair.
2.2 Examples of Metamorphic Viruses
The following sub-sections briefly explain different metamorphic viruses.
2.2.1 G2
G2 is a second generation metamorphic virus generated by the G2 construction
kit. It produces executable instances of G2 virus. The kit uses a configuration file
to create virus files with desired features. It mainly uses the Instruction substitution
technique to morph the virus code [11].
2.2.2 MPCGEN
This Mass Produced Code generation kit produces different copies of a virus.
However copies exhibit more than 60% of similarity between them [4].
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2.2.3 NGVCK
The Next Generation Virus Kit (NGVCK) uses code reordering, garbage code
insertion and register swapping techniques to create highly metamorphic virus code.
The virus creator engine is written in Visual basic and generates 32-bit executable
files [11].
2.2.4 MWOR
MWOR is a metamorphic worm that carries its own engine. The engine’s body
also mutates along with the virus code. It uses multiple morphing techniques such as
garbage code insertion and instruction substitution [17].
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CHAPTER 3
Metamorphic Virus Detection Techniques
Recent studies on computer viruses have focus on many new approaches for
virus detection [18] [11] [2]. Some of them are purely academic and/or experimental
techniques, while a few are being used in commercial antivirus products [11] . Meta-
morphic virus detection is an active area of research due to its challenging nature and
relevance to today’s cybersecurity concerns.
Daoud, Jebril et. al. in their paper ‘Computer Virus Strategies and Detection
Methods’ [5] performed a calculated analysis of available metamorphic detection tech-
niques. Based on their results they proposed the need for a newer and more efficient
detection technique that can handle highly metamorphic viruses [5]. Their paper
describes various computer virus strategies and detection methods and their known
problems. Considering the complex nature of metamorphic viruses, it is critical to
consider more innovative virus detection techniques that focus on the behavior of
virus files along with their structural changes. Following are some of the methods
used to detect metamorphic viruses.
3.1 Wildcard string scanning
Metamorphic viruses that use register swapping or instruction substitution meth-
ods to generate virus copies, can be detected using Wildcard string scanning [9]. These
virus files contain a common set of opcodes across various generations that can be
extracted and matched to check for similarity between virus files.
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3.2 Code Disassembling
By examining each instruction of the virus code, any garbage instructions can
be identified. When this technique is used with a state machine model such as the
Hidden Markov Model [18], this is a powerful tool for detecting viruses that use a
dead code insertion technique [20].
3.3 Code Emulation
This technique requires a virtual machine to execute malicious code [8]. The
virtual execution is monitored frequently to determine when interesting instruction
is executed. The virus code cannot escape from a virtual machine.
3.4 Heuristic-based Recognition
This method is often employed to detect previously unknown viruses. Depending
on features and behaviors of virus files, general rules are created to identify a suspi-
cious file. However, this method is prone to false positive rates in case of metamorphic
virus replication [9].
3.5 Geometric Detection
This method is based on a heuristic that attempts to evaluate how much the
target victim file is changed from its original structure upon infection. It focuses on
physical changes such as file size after infection. However, this method generates more
false positives as the result of changes that may appear because of some unrelated
activities [9].
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3.6 Hidden Markov Models
This experimental research method uses the Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to
detect metamorphic viruses [18]. The HMM model uses virus characteristics for
training. In this technique, different copies of virus files become states of HMM
and the opcode sequences are characterized as observations. This can be effective in
identifying different viruses from the same virus family.
10
CHAPTER 4
Eigenfaces
In this section, we focus on yet another approach to effectively detect metamor-
phic virus. According to the latest paper ‘Eigenviruses for Metamorphic Detection’
[11], a well known facial recognition technique called Eigenfaces can be used for
metamorphic detection. Our metamorphic detection technique is motivated by this
approach. Following sub-sections explain this technique in detail.
A computational model of face recognition can be quite complex and difficult
when each and every feature of a face is considered in the process. It usually requires
three-dimensional geometric computations [14]. However, when a face is assumed to
be an upright flat image, it can be described by a smaller set of 2-dimensional vectors.
This assumption helps in developing a face-recognition technique that is fast, simple
and effective.
With this approach, face images are decomposed into small sets of characteristic
feature images called ‘Eigenfaces’ [14]. These eigenfaces correspond to significant
features of a face, but do not necessarily include intuitive features such as eyes, lips,
nose, etc. The space spanned across eigenfaces is called ‘face-space’ [14]. When known
and unknown face images are projected in this eigenspace, the euclidean distance
between them can be used to determine if a new face is similar to a known face in
the database [14].
In simple terms, relevant information is extracted from available face images.
It is encoded efficiently so that it can be represented by a much smaller data set.
Already known face images are represented in terms of this encoding. Similarly, new
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unknown face images are represented in the same encoding. Finally, we compare the
encoding results for both known and unknown images to determine if a new face
matches to one in the database.
4.1 Eigenvalue and Eigenvectors
The words Eigenvalue and Eigenvectors are derived from the German word Eigen,
which means ‘proper’ or ‘characteristic’ [6]. In linear algebra, if a non-zero vectorx
satisfies the following equation for matrix A, it is called an eigenvector of A and λ is
called the eigenvalue associated with the eigenvector x.
Ax = λx where, λ is a scalar
Figure 5 shows vector x and its transformation λx. If matrix A represents a
transformation performed on vector x, then the resultant vector is a scalar multiple
of the original vector x.
The variation between different images of faces can be thought as a transfor-
mation from its eigenvector. This variation between different random data points
is represented by a Covariance matrix [14]. In order to quantify similarity between
different images, we would like to find eigenvectors of a covariance matrix. Each
eigenvector is associated with its eigenvalue. The higher the eigenvalue, the more
important the eigenvector is considered in the process. A higher eigenvalue means
that its corresponding eigenvector accounts for the most variance within a set of face
images [14].
Figure 6 shows the original face images used in computing a training set and
Figure 7 displays the corresponding eigenvectors.
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Figure 5: Eigenvector
4.2 Image Detection
When eigenvectors of the covariance matrix are drawn into a space, they enclose
some area which is called eigenspace or face-space [11]. When a known image is
projected onto a face-space, it can re-construct an image in terms of its eigenvectors
as shown in Figure 8. When an unknown image is projected into the same eigenspace,
the results may be radically different than expected. This is depicted in Figure 9.
An individual face image can be represented as a linear combination of the eigen-
vectors. This corresponds to the small set of weights associated with each face
image. Example: Suppose V denotes a vector which contains face image data.
Let E1, E2, E3, . . ., E7 be the eigenvectors of the system calculated from the number
of the training face images while ‘V ’ is one of the images from training set. Then,
13
Figure 6: Face Images [14]
the following is true [14].
V = x1E1 + x2E2 + x3E3 + . . .+ x7.E7
where, x1, x2, . . . , .x7 denote the weights associated with vector V with respect to
eigenspace created by eigenvectors E1, E2, E3, . . . ,E7.
When these weights for known and unknown images are compared, we can infer
whether the new image belongs to the training set.
14
Figure 7: Eigenvectors from Face Images [14]
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Figure 8: Original and projected known image [14]
Figure 9: Original and projected unknown image [14]
16
CHAPTER 5
Eigenviruses
The face-recognition scheme discussed in Section 4 is a reasonably simple and
effective method for classifying and recognizing face images. In paper [11], analogous
method is proposed that makes use of eigenvectors to quantify similarity between
known and unknown virus files [11]. Our implementation of the detection technique
is motivated from the method in paper [11]. However, our approach is significantly
different in the sense that we use opcode instructions of virus files instead of raw
binary files. We believe this approach is more effective because we focus on relevant
information in the virus files while ignoring extraneous operand data.
In the following sections, we present the algorithm for metamorphic detection
based on eigenviruses technique.
5.1 Algorithm
The following subsections explain the algorithm used to create the training sets
from virus files.
5.1.1 Training Set
1. Acquire initial set of M virus files.
2. Extract opcodes from binary files for code or text section.
3. Create column vector Φ of size N×1 from opcodes of each virus file. Determine
the largest file size i.e. N bytes. If a vector corresponding to virus file is smaller
than N bytes in length, it is padded with 0s to create N × 1 column vector.
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4. In order to quantify variation between different data points among all files,
compute covariance matrix C for all vector files.
C =
1
M
M∑
i=1
φiφ
T
i (1)
= AAT
where, M = number of files , A = [Φ1,Φ2,Φ3, ...,ΦM ].
5. Ideally, we want to find eigenvectors u of covariance matrix C, where C = AAT .
However, C is a N × N matrix, which could be inefficient to compute. It can
be shown that a matrix L, such that L = ATA , where L is M ×M matrix,
can be used to find eigenvectors of C as follows:
Let vi be an eigenvector of matrix L. Then according to definition of eigenvec-
tors,
Lvi = λivi (2)
ATAvi = λivi where λi is the eigenvalue,
Multiplying both sides by A, we get,
AATAvi = λiAvi (3)
i.e. CAvi = λiAvi
However, C = AAT and Avi is an eigenvector of matrix C. As a result, if v
is a set of eigenvectors of matrix L, where v = v1, v2..vi, then Av is a set of
eigenvectors of matrix C.
Find eigenvectors of matrix L and compute u = Av.
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6. Sort the set of eigenvectors u = u1, u2, ..uM according to their associated eigen-
value λ. The magnitude of eigenvector is defined by eigenvalue. The higher the
eigenvalue, the more important the eigenvector becomes as it can span across
maximum characteristic features of original vectors.
7. We can then choose largest eigenvectors M ′, where M ′ < M . If we draw
these eigenvectors into space, the enclosed area is called eigenspace. Here, we
can ignore eigenvectors with smaller eigenvalues as they do not contribute in
defining the boundary of the eigenspace.
8. The basic eigenspace we computed in the previous step is used to determine how
much the original vector deviates from eigenspace. When these eigenvectors are
linearly combined with specific weights it can give one of the original file vectors.
Then, for file vector φ and eigenvectors u1, u2, . . . , uM ,
φ = u1ω1 + u2ω2 + . . .+ uMωM (4)
where, M = number of important eigenvectors
i.e.
φ =
M∑
i=1
uiωi (5)
then,
ωi =
M∑
i=1
uTi φ (6)
The weights for virus file φi can be given as follows:
ΩTi = [ω1, ω2, ω3, . . . , ωM ] (7)
These weights correspond to projecting a virus file into eigenspace as they de-
termine its exact position in the eigenspace.
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9. In this way, we calculate weight vectors for all virus files M and combine it into
matrix ∆ as follows.
∆ = [Ω1,Ω2,Ω3, . . . ,ΩM ] (8)
This becomes the training set for our technique.
5.1.2 Test set
We calculate weight vectors for the test files same as we did with training files
as mentioned in Section 5.1.1. If the test files belong to the same virus family, their
location in eigenspace would be closer to each other. In other words, the distance
between the weight vectors of known and unknown files will be relatively short.
1. Project the input file Φk into eigenspace and determine its weights.
ωi =
M∑
i=1
uTi φk (9)
ΩTk = [ω1, ω2, . . . , ωM ] (10)
2. Compute Euclidean distance between weight vector of test file and each weight
vector in the training set. If Ωi is weight vector from training set then the
euclidean distance between Ωk and Ωi is given as follows,
i =
√
(ω21 − ρ21) + (ω22 − ρ22) + ....+ (ω2M − ρ2M) (11)
where, ω and ρ are individual weight values in respective weight vectors.
3. This distance  measures how much the input test file represents the virus
features. The lower the number, the closer the test file is to the training set.
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CHAPTER 6
Implementation
We implemented the algorithm discussed in Section 5.1. Additionally, we em-
ployed normalization to eigenvectors to simplify the calculations.
6.1 Opcode Extraction
We extracted opcodes from only relevant sections of a binary file such as ‘code’
or ‘text’ section. We stored approximately 200 distinct opcode instructions. We are
interested in the equivalent byte codes of each opcode. It is possible that the same
opcode refers to a different byte code depending on the operands it uses. We have
ignored this distinction in our experiment as we do not extract operand data.
6.2 Normalization
Eigenvectors obtained in the process have varying scales. To create an usable
eigenspace, scale variations need to be normalized. Each eigenvector is associated
with its corresponding eigenvalue and a scalar multiple of an eigenvector is also an
eignevector. Therefore to unify the eigenvectors with respect to their eigenvalues, we
divide each eigenvector by the square root of its eigenvalue.
µ =
1√
λ
u where, u is an eigenvector and λ is its eigenvalue
In all the experiments, we used normalized eigenvector µ in place of u.
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6.3 Virus Detection
We start with the initial matrix A[M,N ], here N is maximum file size among
available virus files and M is total number of virus files used for training. This matrix
is fed to the Matlab tool that executes the algorithm steps discussed in Section 5.1.
It generates eigenspace and computes weights for each virus file. This constitutes to
the training set.
Test set is generated by computing weights for each virus file with respect to
the eigenspace created in the training set. Finally,we calculate distance between the
weight vectors of training set and test set and determine if the test file belongs to the
training set.
The process is summarized in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Implementation
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6.4 Setup
Table 1 shows the experiment setup we used to carry out the experiment.
Table 1: Experiment setup
Type Description
Operating System Linux Ubuntu 11.2, 32-bit
Matlab R2011b
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CHAPTER 7
Experimental Results
In our experiment we carried out testing for different virus families as listed in
Table 2. For limited number of test files, we used the five fold cross validation method
to generate ample number of test sets. We chose 80% of available files for training
and the rest are allocated for testing. For the next round of testing, we strategically
shuﬄe the files in the training set and the test set. This gives advantage of producing
more data for testing while reducing the data bias.
Table 2: Virus families
Virus Operating System Total Training Files Testing Files
G2 Windows 50 40 10
MPCGEN Windows 50 40 10
NGVCK Windows 50 40 10
MWOR Linux 800 50 750
Table 3 shows various benign files used for testing. The cygwin files are tested
along with windows executable virus such as NGVCK. For MWOR, we used linux
benign files, the same that are used for dead code insertion in the worm. This provides
more challenging test for MWOR files.
Table 3: Benign Files
Benign Files Description Total
Cygwin Files Executables from cygwin utility 33
Linux Files Linux binaries 11
7.1 Results
The following sub-sections display graphs for individual virus families. We plot-
ted the euclidean distance between each test file and the known virus file. A lower
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value of the euclidean distance, denotes that the test file is closer to the training set.
7.1.1 G2
Figure 11 displays graph for G2 virus files. Here, both cygwin and linux files
are tested against the training set of G2 virus files. Our technique can detect all G2
virus files and benign files accurately, giving 0% false positive and 0% false negative
results.
Figure 11: G2 virus
7.1.2 MPCGEN
Similar to the G2 files, we computed a training set, using MPCGEN files. Both
cygwin andl linux files are tested along with the virus files. Figure 12 shows a clear
distinction between virus and benign files. All MPCGEN virus files are detected
accurately by the system.
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Figure 12: MPCGEN virus
7.1.3 NGVCK
NGVCK is a more complex virus than MPCGEN and G2. It uses multiple
morphing techniques to create different virus instances [11]. Our detection technique
offers quite good results maintaining the value of false positive and false negative
rates to minimum. As shown in Figure 13, out of 50 test files only 2 files are falsely
detected as benign and one of the benign files is detected as a virus by the system.
7.1.4 MWOR
MWOR is a metamorphic worm developed as a part of academic research [17]. It
uses two metamorphic techniques: equivalent instruction substitution, and dead code
insertion. The percentage of dead code inserted can be given by a “padding ratio”,
where the padding ratio is the number of dead instructions divided by the number
of instructions that constitute core functionality of the worm. For example, MWOR
with a padding ratio of 0.5 indicates that 50% as much as the actual virus instructions
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Figure 13: NGVCK virus
are inserted in the virus to obfuscate its functionality. We tested approximately 750
files ranging from 50% to 400% of the dead code. The scores for virus and benign
linux files are shown in Figure 14. Our technique works well in detecting a high level
morphed copy of the MWOR virus.
7.2 Results for MWOR binaries
We performed similar tests using binaries instead of opcodes. Opcodes as well
as operands are extracted for binaries and processed to create eigenspace. Figure 15
shows the results for testing MWOR files. In this case, we used the training set
containing binaries of MWOR with padding ratio 0.5. Based on the graph, it can be
seen that MWOR binaries outperformed the opcode technique. We speculate that
the lack of operand data in case of opcodes technique causes it to loose accuracy in
the detection.
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Figure 14: MWOR opcodes with training set MWOR 0.5
Figure 15: MWOR binaries with training set MWOR 0.5
7.3 Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curves
ROC Curves are used to assess the accuracy of a test based on its true and false
positive results. It is a well known technique typically employed in the medical field
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[21]. The true positive rate of the test is plotted against the false positive rate. The
accuracy of the test depends on how well the test distinguishes between true positives
and false positives among the available data set. When data points are plotted based
on the results of the test, the area enclosed inside the graph is called Area under
Curve (AUC).
The AUC represents if the test is accurate for a given data set. AUC = 1.0
represents a perfect test as it gives a 100% true positive rate and a 0% false positive
rate. Based on the results in section 7.1, we plotted ROC curves for all virus families
to analyze effectiveness of our technique.
Table 4 shows the AUC statistics for all virus families along with their standard
error rate. The same for MWOR are shown in Table 5. Figure 16, 17, 18, 19 show
the ROC curves for MWOR, NGVCK, MPCGEN and G2 virus respectively.
Table 4: AUC Statistics for virus families
Virus AUC Standard Error
G2 1 0
MPCGEN 1 0
NGVCK 0.94727 0.02812
7.4 AUC statistics
For the comparison purpose, we produce the standard error tables for both op-
code and binary approach for MWOR virus in Table 5 and 6 respectively. The AUC
tables demonstrate that Eigenviruses technique outperformed HMM based detection
technique as shown in Table 6 and Table 7.
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Figure 16: ROC for MWOR
Table 5: AUC Statistics for MWOR with training set of MWOR 0.5
Padding Ratio AUC Standard Error
0.5 0.94933 0.02739
1.0 0.9538 0.01949
1.5 0.95578 0.01966
2.0 0.95908 0.01814
2.5 0.95267 0.01976
3.0 0.948 0.02105
3.5 0.96067 0.01727
4.0 0.94587 0.02292
30
Figure 17: ROC for NGVCK
Table 6: AUC Statistics for MWOR binaries with training set of MWOR 0.5
Padding Ratio AUC Standard Error
0.5 1 0
1.0 1 0
1.5 1 0
2.0 1 0
2.5 1 0
3.0 1 0
3.5 1 0
4.0 1 0
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Figure 18: ROC for MPCGEN
Table 7: AUC statistics for MWOR using HMM detection
Padding Ratio AUC Standard Error
0.5 1 0
1.0 0.99 0.0105
1.5 0.9625 0.03503
2.0 0.9725 0.02112
2.5 0.8325 0.06556
3.0 0.8575 0.06225
4.0 0.8225 0.06661
32
Figure 19: ROC for G2
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion
Metamorphic virus detection is a challenging task. There have been many at-
tempts to detect highly metamorphic virus in the past [9] [18] [3] [2] [1]. We imple-
mented an eigenviruses technique mentioned in the Eigenviruses paper [11]. After
successful detection of NGVCK virus files, we proceeded to implement the same
technique using a different approach. We used opcodes of virus files instead of raw
binaries. It is observed that this approach is more accurate because it focuses on
more relevant code information and avoids processing extraneous operand data.
We implemented our proposed approach and analyzed the results by testing
various metamorphic virus families such as G2, MPCGEN, NGVCK and MWOR.
The technique gave more than 94% accurate detection of virus files. When two
approaches are compared, the opcode approach provided a more convergent graph
for the virus files from the same family. Better segregation between scores of benign
and virus files proved to be crucial in classification. We also employed variations in
the test to improve computational efficiency. It is observed that only 20% of total
eigenvectors suffice to effectively detect all virus files, keeping false positive and false
negative rates low.
Very few virus detection techniques materialize in an antivirus product due to
their computational infeasibility and high rate of false positives. Based on the results
of this technique, we believe it can aptly complement traditional antivirus products.
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8.1 Future work
Due to limited time and resources, only four well-known metamorphic viruses
were tested. As part of future testing efforts, the proposed system should be vali-
dated with well-known and hard-to-detect metamorphic viruses such as W95/Zmist,
W95/Zperm or W95/Bistro.
We used separate training sets for each virus family. It will be interesting to see
the results when single training set containing samples of each virus family is used to
train the model. Threshold for each virus family can be heuristically set to identify
a test le.
With a higher number of virus families the euclidean distance may not provide
accurate results. Instead, a more effective Mahalanobis distance can be used. It
takes into account the correlation of the data set and also its scale-invariant [10]. It
can help us perform cluster analysis of the metamorphic viruses which then can be
classified in families.
Code packing is a common technique that transforms executable virus code into
data as a post-processing stage in the malware development cycle. At run time, the
data, or hidden code, is restored to its original executable form through dynamic
code generation using an associated restoration routine. In order to reduce the errors
while detecting such virus, some malware normalization techniques can be used to
preprocess the virus replicates. A depermutator may help recognize and extract the
real virus code. With such preprocessing for the test file, we believe that the system
performance can be improved.
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APPENDIX A
Opcode to Bytecode Map
Byte code Opcode
01 ADD
06 PUSH
07 POP
08 OR
10 ADC
18 SBB
27 DAA
28 SUB
2F DAS
30 XOR
37 AAA
38 CMP
3F AAS
60 PUSHA
60 PUSHAD
61 POPA
61 POPAD
62 BOUND
63 ARPL
69 IMUL
70 JO
6D INS
6D INSB
6E OUTS
6E OUTSB
6F OUTS
6F OUTSW
71 JNO
72 JB
72 JNAE
72 JC
73 JNB
73 JAE
73 JNC
74 JZ
Continued on next page
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Table A.8 – Continued from previous page
Byte code Opcode
74 JE
75 JNZ
75 JNE
76 JBE
76 JNA
77 JNBE
77 JA
78 JS
79 JNS
7A JP
7A JPE
7B JNP
7B JPO
7C JL
7C JNGE
7D JNL
7D JGE
7E JLE
7E JNG
7F JNLE
7F JG
84 TEST
86 XCHG
88 MOV
8D LEA
90 PAUSE
98 CBW
98 CWDE
99 CWD
99 CDQ
9A CALLF
9B FWAIT
9B WAIT
9C PUSHF
9C PUSHFD
9D POPF
9D POPFD
9E SAHF
9F LAHF
Continued on next page
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Table A.8 – Continued from previous page
Byte code Opcode
A4 MOVS
A4 MOVSB
A5 MOVSW
A5 MOVSD
A6 CMPS
C8 ENTER
C9 LEAVE
CA RETF
CC INT
CE INTO
D0 ROL
D0 ROR
D0 SHL
D8 FDIV
D9 FLD
D9 FNOP
E0 LOOPNZ
E0 LOOPNE
E1 LOOPZ
E1 LOOPE
E2 LOOP
E3 JCXZ
E3 JECXZ
E4 IN
E6 OUT
E8 CALL
E9 JMP
EA JMPF
F2 REPNZ
F2 REPNE
F2 REP
F6 DIV
F6 IDIV
F7 NOT
F7 NEG
F7 MUL
F8 CLC
FE DEC
FF JMPF
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APPENDIX B
Additional Graphs
B.1 Euclidean distance Graphs
B.1.1 MWOR with consolidated training set
Graph B.20 displays the scores for MWOR files when tested against the training
set containing consolidated training set.
Figure B.20: MWOR virus with consolidated training set
B.1.2 MWOR with different training sets
Graph B.21 displays the scores for MWOR files when tested against different
training sets.
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Figure B.21: MWOR virus with consolidated training set
B.1.3 MWOR with 20% eigenvectors
Graph B.22 displays the scores for MWOR files when tested against the
eigenspace constructed by 20% of total eigenvectors.
B.1.4 MWOR with 6% eigenvectors
Figure B.23 shows the results when only 6% of total eigenvectors are considered
to construct a training set.
B.1.5 NGVCK with 20% eigenvectors
Figure B.24 shows the results for NGVCK. We can see that scores for benign
files are closer to virus files when only 20% of eigenvectors are used.
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Figure B.22: MWOR virus with 20% eigenvectors
Figure B.23: MWOR virus with 6% eigenvectors
B.1.6 NGVCK with 6% eigenvectors
Figure B.25 shows the test results when NGVCK is tested with 6% of total
eigenvectors. In some cases, the score for virus files are much closer to the benign
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Figure B.24: NGVCK virus with 20% eigenvectors
files such that they become indistinguishable.
Figure B.25: NGVCK virus with 6% eigenvectors
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B.2 ROC Graphs
B.2.1 ROC for MWOR with 20% eigenvectors
Graph B.26 shows ROC for MWOR files when 20% of total eigenvectors are used.
Figure B.26: ROC : MWOR with 20% eigenvectors
B.2.2 ROC for MWOR with 6% eigenvectors
Graph B.27 shows ROC for MWOR files when 6% of total eigenvectors are used.
AUC = 0.972
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Figure B.27: ROC : MWOR with 6% eigenvectors
B.2.3 ROC for MWOR Binary files
Text section from MWOR binaries are extracted and used to create eigenvectors.
Method offers good classification among MWOR and benign binaries as shown in
Figure B.28.
B.2.4 ROC for NGVCK with 20% eigenvectors
Graph B.29 shows ROC for NGVCK files when 20% of total eigenvectors are
used. AUC = 0.969
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Figure B.28: ROC : MWOR binaries
B.2.5 ROC for NGVCK with 6% eigenvectors
Graph B.30 shows ROC for NGVCK files when 6% of total eigenvectors are used.
AUC = 0.942
B.2.6 ROC for NGVCK binary files
Graph B.31 shows ROC for NGVCK binary files. AUC = 0.982
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Figure B.29: ROC : NGVCK with 20% eigenvectors
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Figure B.30: ROC : NGVCK with 6% eigenvectors
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Figure B.31: ROC : NGVCK Binary Files
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